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Abstract
We study a credence goods market in which an expert holds private information
about his treatment cost besides his superior knowledge about the nature of the
consumer’s problem. Under the assumption of liability, cheating may occur through
overcharging—a price for major treatment is charged while a minor treatment is
provided, while under liability and verifiability, cheating can only occur through
costly overtreatment of minor problems. Neither liability nor liability and verifiabil-
ity achieves socially efficient outcome. Adding verifiability improves social welfare
because it increases the probability that a major problem is repaired and the associ-
ated overtreatment cost is dominated by the gain from more problems being repaired.
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1 Introduction
In a credence goods market, the expert knows more about the nature of the consumer’s
problem, that is, whether it is a major problem that demands a major treatment or a
minor one that demands a minor treatment. Even after consumption, the consumer may
still have no idea whether the goods or services she has received was appropriate (Darby
and Karni (1973)). For example, the water pump in a consumer’s car is leaking, and the
mechanic suggests replacing the pump (a major treatment). After the repair, the pump
functions well but the consumer never knows whether replacing a valve (a minor treatment)
would have been sufficient to solve the problem or a new pump was indeed necessary.
The information advantage of the expert—the expert knows more about the nature
of the consumer’s problem than the consumer herself—leads to cheating incentive for the
expert: he may provide the consumer a major treatment for a larger profit even if a minor
treatment is sufficient to resolve the consumer’s problem, or provide the consumer a minor
treatment which does not solve the consumer’s problem, or charge the consumer a price
for major treatment even though a minor treatment has been provided.
The expert may also have private information about his treatment cost, besides his su-
perior knowledge about the nature of the consumer’s problem. Private information about
production cost on the side of goods/service supplier is an important issue in industrial
organization theory and has been well studied in the analysis of firm behavior in regular
goods market. Firms choose their outputs and prices differently when their production
costs are private information rather than common knowledge. A monopoly with private
information on production cost may use “limit pricing” to threaten potential market en-
trants. Uncertainty about a firm’s production cost is a primary concern for a government
in the regulation of natural monopoly. Such private information naturally exists in the
provision of credence goods as well but has so far been largely ignored in the literature.1
A direct implication of the additional private information on the expert’s treatment cost
is that “equal-margin principle” fails to implement the efficient outcome. In the literature
(see, for example, Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)), the equal-margin principle has been
an important rule in solving the expert’s cheating incentive: if the expert receives the same
profit margin from providing different types of treatment, he has no incentive to provide
the wrong treatment or charge the wrong price. The rule no longer achieves efficiency
1For example, a mechanic has private information on how long it takes him to fix a consumer’s engine
problem. A surgeon knows privately how skilled he is in an operation. See Hilger (2016) for more examples.
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when the expert holds private information about his treatment cost—if a pricing scheme
generates equal profit margin for one type of expert in the provision of different types of
treatment, it must generate unequal profit margin for some other type of the expert, thus
distorting his incentive in the provision of services.
We introduce the expert’s private information about his treatment cost into an other-
wise standard credence goods model. The consumer’s problem is either minor or major.
An expert can always diagnose and repair a minor problem at zero cost. However, to repair
a major problem, a low-cost expert incurs a lower treatment cost than a high-cost expert.
The expert knows whether he is a high-cost type or low-cost type, but the consumer only
knows the prior distribution of types. In our expert-consumer game the expert is a price
setter, and the prices he posts may convey information about his types. We are interested
in how the private information of the expert on his treatment cost affects the equilibrium
outcome and how different market institutions perform given this new dimension of private
information.
We focus on two types of market institutions/assumptions: i) liability (L), ii) liability
and verifiability (LV ). The expert is liable for the outcome of the treatment under the
assumption of liability. The type of treatment is costlessly verifiable by the consumer under
the assumption of verifiability. These two institutions are important tools that are very
often explored in the literature for the regulation of the experts’ behavior. See, for example,
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006), and Fong, Liu, and Wright (2014). Both institutions can
be implemented or enforced through legal systems. Liability can be enforced through harsh
punishment of the expert if he does not resolve the consumer’s problem. Verifiability can
be implemented through creating hard evidence of the treatment process. For example,
some service providers videotype or record the treatment process for file. Some mechanics
return the consumers’ replaced parts as a way to verify the type of treatment provided.
Under liability, an expert can not provide a minor treatment when a major one is
necessary because a minor one does not repair the consumer’s problem. Nevertheless, the
expert can overcharge —charging the consumer a price for major treatment while a minor
treatment is provided. The expert also has the option to overtreat the consumer—providing
major treatment when only minor treatment is necessary. But overtreating is dominated
for the expert because overcharging brings the same price of major treatment without
actually incurring the cost of major treatment. Thus under L, cheating may occur in the
form of overcharging. If verifiability is in place, the expert can not charge the consumer a
price for major treatment while providing a minor one because the consumer can costlessly
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verify the type of treatment she receives, but the expert can provide a major treatment
when a minor treatment is needed. Therefore, under LV cheating may occur in the form
of overtreatment.
When there are multiple equilibria outcomes, we focus on the one in which both types
of the experts’ payoffs are maximized, that is, the Pareto dominating equilibrium for the
experts.2 Under liability, in the experts’ Pareto dominating equilibrium, both types of
experts behave honestly but a major problem remains unrepaired with positive probabil-
ity because the consumer disciplines the expert by rejecting with positive probability a
recommendation to repair her problem at the price of major treatment.
Under liability and verifiability, different types of equilibrium outcome prevail depend-
ing on how likely the expert is a low-cost type. If the expert is very likely to be a low-cost
type, the prevailing equilibrium is similar in nature to the one under liability: the experts
behave honestly but the consumer disciplines the expert by rejecting a recommendation of
major treatment with positive probability. If the expert is more likely to be a high-cost
type, the prevailing equilibrium is a cheating one—a low-cost expert always overtreats in
case of a minor problem, a high-cost type may or may not overtreats depending on the
parameters. In these cheating equilibria outcomes, the prices for major treatments are
relatively low and the consumer always accepts a recommendation of major treatment.
One may conjecture that imposing verifiability on top of liability decreases social wel-
fare because overcharging under L is purely a monetary transfer between the consumer and
the expert and does not hurt social welfare, while when verifiability is added overtreatment
incurs wasteful treatment cost. We find that, in contrast, adding verifiability always im-
proves social welfare. When the expert is more likely to be low-cost type, the experts do
not cheat in equilibrium under both L and LV, but verifiability increases the consumer’s
probability of accepting a recommendation of major treatment. As a result, a major prob-
lem is repaired at a higher probability under LV and social welfare is improved. When
the expert is more likely to be a high-cost type, the experts overtreat in equilibrium under
LV but the price for major treatment is relatively low and the consumer always accepts a
recommendation of major treatment. As a result, a major problem is always repaired. The
gain from repaired major problem dominates the social loss from wasteful overtreatment
cost, and thus imposing verifiability improves social welfare.
There is a large literature that analyses how different market structure and institutions
2If such an equilibrium exists, it is also the experts’ optimal equilibrium. Pareto domination is used in
the selection of equilibria in other papers as well, for example, in Anton and Yao (1989).
4
affect the behavior of experts in a credence goods market. See, for example, Pitchik and
Schotter (1987), Wolinsky (1995), Emons (1997), Emons (2001), Fong (2005), Alger and
Salanie´ (2006), Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009). Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) offer a
nice survey of the early contributions in a united framework. More recent works include Liu
(2011) that analyses the credence goods market with the coexistence of conscientious and
selfish experts, Fong, Liu, and Wright (2014) that compare the performance of verifiability
vs. liability, Bester and Dahm (2014) that consider the impact of subjective evaluation,
Frankel and Schwarz (2014) that analyse a repeated interaction, Dulleck and Wigger (2015)
that model the services of politicians as credence goods, and Dulleck, Gong, and Li (2015)
that compare the performance of auctions and sequential search in a procurement envi-
ronment. Our paper is different from most of these contributions by taking into account
a second dimension of the experts’ private information and analysing how this additional
private information affects the experts’ behavior under different institutions.
There are a few papers that model additional private information besides the expert’s
information advantage on the nature of the consumer’s problem. Fong (2005) analyses a
model in which consumers differ in their losses from the same problem under the assumption
of liability and asks when the experts cheat, and whom do they target. Liu (2011) analyses
a credence goods market with the coexistence of conscientious and selfish experts under
the assumption of liability. In her model, a conscientious expert benefits from repairing
a consumer’s problem—as a result, there exists a nonuniform price equilibrium in which
different types of experts post different price lists. In our setting, the private information
is on treatment cost, and there exists no separating equilibrium in which different types of
experts reveal their types through different prices. Fong, Liu, and Wright (2014) discuss
the experts’ behavior if honest experts who never cheat coexist with selfish expert under the
assumption of verifiability. Different from these papers, we analyse both the case of liability
and the case of liability and verifiability, and this exercise allows us to assess the incremental
benefit of imposing the assumption of verifiability in the credence goods market. Hilger
(2016) accounts for the factor that consumers may not be able to observe expert cost
functions and shows that the assumption of verifiability leads to mistreatment on the side
of the expert. We analyse a more dynamic model by allowing the consumers to walk away
after receiving a recommendation from the expert. We also show that mistreatment occurs
in equilibrium if verifiability is in place but our focus is on a complementary question—
since verifiability leads to mistreatment, is it socially beneficial to impose verifiability if it
is a choice of institutions?
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
credence goods model with the coexistence of high-cost and low-cost experts. Section 3
analyses the equilibria under liability. Section 4 analyses the equilibria when both liability
and verifiability hold. In Section 5 we discuss the social benefit of adding verifiability.
In Section 6 we analyse the model under alternative parameter specifications. Section 7
concludes. All the proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
There is one monopoly expert and one consumer. The consumer has a problem k, either
a minor one (m) or a major one (M). The consumer’s utility is −ℓk with ℓM > ℓm > 0 if
her problem remains unresolved and −P if her problem is repaired at price P .
The expert provides two procedures of treatment T ∈ {m,M}. Treatment M repairs
both types of problems but treatment m only repairs a minor problem. The expert can
be of two cost types: a low-cost type (L) or a high-cost type (H). Experts of both types
perform treatment m at zero cost. A low-cost expert performs treatment M at cost c while
a high-cost expert performs treatment M at cost θc, with θ > 1. Parameter θ measures
the cost disparity between the two types of experts.
The consumer does not know the nature of her problem, thus the treatment she needs,
nor does she observe the type (t ∈ {L,H}) of the expert. But she knows the population
distribution
Pr(k = M) = 1− Pr(k = m) = β; Pr(t = L) = 1− Pr(t = H) = γ (1)
in which β ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ [0, 1]. It is the expert’s private information whether his type
is L or H . The expert privately learns the nature of consumer’s problem after costless
diagnosis.
We make the following assumptions regarding the parameters
ℓm < ℓ¯ < c < θc < ℓM in which ℓ¯ = βℓM + (1− β)ℓm, (2)
ℓM − θc > ℓm. (3)
Assumption (2) ensures that i) it is efficient for both types of experts to repair a major
problem, ii) the cost of repairing a major problem is larger than the ex ante expected loss
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to the consumer. In section 6, we analyze the alternative case with parameter specifications
ℓm < c < ℓ¯ < θc < ℓM .
3 Assumption (3) ensures that repairing a major problem is more
socially valuable than repairing a minor problem for both types of experts.
Following the literature (for example Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)), we define the
market institutions of liability and verifiability as follows.
Definition 1. Liability(L): the consumer can verify ex post whether his problem is
resolved or not at zero cost and the expert is liable for the outcome of the treatment.
Verifiability(V ): the type of treatment the consumer receives is costlessly verifiable.
If the expert repairs the problem k ∈ {m,M}, under the institution of liability, the
consumer knows that her problem is solved but does not know which treatment has been
provided; under the institution of verifiability, the consumer learns the type of treatment
she has received. Thus, under liability, the expert can not perform a treatment m if
k =M because a minor treatment can not repair a major problem—insufficient treatment
is precluded by liability. Under the institution of verifiability, the expert can not charge
the price of a minor (major) treatment when a major (minor) treatment is performed—
mischarging is precluded.
In the following analysis, we consider a game in which the expert posts prices for
different types of treatments after privately observing his cost type. The prices an expert
posts reveal (partly) the experts’ private information on his cost types. As in most signaling
games, there exists a plethora of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. Whenever possible, we
will focus on the pareto dominating equilibrium outcome for the experts—the equilibrium
outcome that generates the (weakly) highest expected payoffs for both types of experts
among all possible equilibrium outcomes.
3 Equilibrium under Liability
In this section, we analyse the expert-consumer game under the institution of liability. The
game proceeds as follows:
1. Nature draws the expert’s type t and reveals the information privately to the expert.
2. Knowing his type, the expert posts a price list (P tM , P
t
m), with P
t
m ≤ P
t
M , P
t
M ≤ ℓM
and P tm ≤ ℓm.
3Note that the case ℓm < c < θc < ℓ¯ < ℓM is trivial because there always exists an efficient equilibrium
in which the experts repair the consumers’ problems at price ℓ¯.
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3. Nature draws the consumer’s type k and the consumer visits the expert. The expert
learns the nature of the consumer’s problem. The expert either declines to repair the
consumer’s problem or offers to repair the problem at price P tk, with k ∈ {m,M}.
If the expert declines to treat the consumer, the game ends. Otherwise, the game
proceeds to the next stage.
4. If the consumer accepts the expert’s offer, the expert must repair the problem at the
quoted price. If the consumer declines the offer, the consumer’s problem remains
unrepaired and the expert receives no payment.
The expert’s strategy consists of a pair of prices (P tM , P
t
m) at stage 2 and a recom-
mendation policy at stage 3. The recommendation policy specifies the probabilities that
the expert offers to repair the consumer’s problem at P tM , P
t
m, and rejects to treat the
consumer, conditional on the nature of the problem k ∈ {M,m}. The subgame following
each given price list (P tM , P
t
m) is referred to as a “recommendation subgame”.
Note that due to the restriction P tm ≤ P
t
M , an expert never offers to repair a major
problem at P tm—he either offers to repair the problem at P
t
M or rejects to treat the con-
sumer. Thus, we use ρt to denote the probability that a type t expert offers to repair a
minor problem at price P tM . Further note that for any P
t
m ≥ 0, an expert never rejects to
repair a minor problem because the cost of repairing a minor problem is zero. We use φt
as the probability that a type t expert rejects to repair a major problem.
The consumer’s strategy is her probability of accepting an offer at PM or Pm. Given the
assumption of liability, on receiving an offer Pm, the consumer can infer that her problem
is minor and thus always accepts the offer if Pm ≤ ℓm. For the expert, it is never optimal
to post a price Pm > ℓm and being rejected when recommending a treatment at Pm. Thus,
in the following analysis, we use λ for the consumer’s probability of accepting an offer at
price PM .
A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium must satisfy the following three conditions:
1. Each type of the expert’s strategy maximizes his expected payoff given the consumer’s
strategy.
2. The consumer’s strategy maximizes her expected payoff given her beliefs about the
nature of her problem and the expert’s cost type.
3. The consumer’s beliefs are correct on the equilibrium path.
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The game is solved through backward induction. Cheating in the form of overcharging
occurs if ρt > 0 for any t in equilibrium, that is, at least one type of the expert charges
P tM with positive probability when k = m. The next proposition states the main result of
this section.
Proposition 1 (No-cheating outcome). In the experts’ pareto-dominating equilibrium,
both types of experts post the same price list (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm). Both types of experts
truthfully reveal the nature of the consumer’s problem (ρH = ρL = 0) and never reject to
provide a treatment (φH = φL = 0). An offer at Pm is always accepted and an offer at
PM is accepted by the consumer with probability λ =
ℓm
ℓM
. The experts’ expected payoffs
from this equilibrium outcome are respectively ΠL = β(ℓM − c)
ℓm
ℓM
+ (1 − β)ℓm and ΠH =
β(ℓM − θc)
ℓm
ℓM
+ (1− β)ℓm.
In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that in a recommendation subgame following
a pooling price list (PM , Pm) ∈ [θc, ℓM ] × [0, ℓm], there is an equilibrium in which both
types of experts play the same mixed strategies. The equilibrium strategy profile in each
subgame is characterized by
φH = φL = 0, ρH = ρL =
β(ℓM − PM)
(1− β)(PM − ℓm)
, λ =
Pm
PM
. (4)
See Lemma 3 in the appendix for the proof. For any PM < ℓM , ρ
t ∈ (0, 1), cheating
(overcharging) does occur in these subgames. In the whole game, these cheating outcomes
can also be sustained as an equilibrium outcome of the whole game through the construction
of proper consumer belief systems. Nevertheless, the experts’ expected payoffs from these
equilibria are dominated by the payoffs of the experts if they set (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm).
There are also other equilibria outcomes with both types of experts overcharging, for
example, if (PM , Pm) ∈ [c, θc] × [0, ℓm] (see Lemma 2 in the appendix). But the experts’
payoffs from these equilibria outcomes are dominated as well.
Furthermore, as we show in the proof of Lemma 6, there exists no separating equilibrium
in which the experts post different price lists that reveal perfectly their cost types, nor does
there exist a uniform price equilibrium in which the experts post a single price for both
types of treatments.
The existence of no-cheating equilibrium does not mean that the outcome is efficient. In
the equilibrium outcome in Proposition 1, although the experts do not cheat, the consumer
declines an offer at price PM with positive probability to discipline the expert’s overcharging
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incentive. Rejecting an offer at PM with positive probability leaves a major problem
unresolved and causes social inefficiency. As a result, a major problem remains unresolved
with probability 1− ℓm
ℓM
and in such case the consumer suffers a loss −ℓM . When a major
problem is resolved, it is resolved at an expected cost of γc+ (1− γ)θc. A minor problem
is always repaired at zero cost. We summarize the expected social welfare level as follows.
Corollary 1. The social welfare level under the institution of liability is given by
WL = −β(1−
ℓm
ℓM
)ℓM − β
ℓm
ℓM
(γc+ (1− γ)θc)
= −β(ℓM − ℓm)− β
ℓm
ℓM
(γc+ (1− γ)θc) (5)
4 Equilibria under Liability and Verifiability
In this section, we assume that both the institutions of liability and verifiability are in
place. As discussed before, under the assumption of verifiability, the type of treatment
provided can be costlessly verified by the consumer. As a result, different from the case
in Section 3, an expert can not charge the consumer a price Pk 6= Pk′ if treatment k
′ is
performed, with k 6= k′ ∈ {M,m}.
The game is slightly different from the one in Section 3. Given that the prices are
announced at stage 2, the expert’s action is to recommend a treatment to the consumer at
stage 3 (instead of making an offer to repair the consumer’s problem at one of the posted
prices in Section 3). If the recommended treatment is accepted, the expert will perform
the treatment and get paid the posted price for that treatment.
3. Nature draws the consumer’s type. The consumer visits the expert. Through di-
agnosis, the expert learns the nature of the consumer’s problem. The expert either
rejects to treat the consumer or recommends a treatment T . If the expert rejects to
treat the consumer, the game ends. Otherwise, the game proceeds to the next stage.
4. If the consumer accepts the recommendation, the recommended treatment T ∈
{m,M} is performed in exchange for a price P tT . If the consumer declines the recom-
mendation, the consumer’s problem remains unrepaired and the expert receives no
payment.
The expert’s strategy consists of a list of prices {P tM , P
t
m} at stage 2 and a recom-
mendation policy at stage 3 in which the expert either rejects to treat the consumer or
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recommends a major treatment or a minor treatment. Note that if k = M , the expert
can either choose to recommend a major treatment or rejects to treat the consumer, while
providing a minor treatment does not resolve the consumer’s problem and is not feasible
due to the assumption of liability. Let ρt be the shorthand for the probability with which
the expert of type t recommends major treatment when the problem is k = m. Again we
use φt for the probability that a type t expert rejects to treat a consumer if k = M .
The consumer’s strategy specifies the probability of accepting or rejecting the expert’s
recommendation. Due to the restriction Pm ≤ ℓm and the assumption of liability, whenever
the consumer is recommended a minor treatment, the consumer can infer that her problem
must be minor and thus never declines a recommendation T = m. We denote λ as the
probability that the consumer accepts a recommendation of major treatment.
Overtreating occurs if in equilibrium an expert prescribes major treatment with positive
probability when k = m, that is, ρt > 0 for any t ∈ {L,H}. The magnitude of γ, the
probability that an expert is of a low-cost type, affects the existence of different types of
equilibria in the recommendation subgame following a given price list, thus, the equilibrium
outcome of the whole game depends upon γ as well. We summarize the main results of
this section in Propositions 2 to 4.
Proposition 2 (No-cheating outcome). Suppose γ > β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
. In the experts’ Pareto
dominating equilibrium outcome, both types of experts post the pooling price list (PM , Pm) =
(ℓM , ℓm). Given this price list, both types of experts recommend a treatment honestly (that
is, φt = 0, ρt = 0). A recommendation of major treatment is rejected by a consumer
with positive probability (λ = ℓm
ℓM−c
) and a recommendation of minor treatment is always
accepted. The experts’ expected payoffs from this equilibrium outcome are respectively ΠL =
ℓm and Π
H = ℓm(1−
β(θ−1)c
ℓM−c
).
In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that in the recommendation subgame following
a pooling price list (PM , Pm) such that (PM , Pm) ∈ [max{θc, Pm + c,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
γ(1−β)+β
}, ℓM ] ×
[0, ℓm], there is an equilibrium involving the following strategy profiles:
φH = φL = 0, ρH = 0, ρL =
β(ℓM − PM)
γ(1− β)(PM − ℓm)
, λ =
Pm
PM − c
. (6)
See Lemma 7 in the appendix for the proof. In this equilibrium of the recommendation
subgame, a high-cost expert treats the consumer honestly and a low-cost type expert
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partially overtreats (that is, ρL ∈ (0, 1]). The experts’ expected payoffs are respectively
ΠH = β(PM − θc)
Pm
PM − c
+ (1− β)Pm, Π
L = Pm. (7)
Because the experts’ expected payoffs increase in PM and Pm, any perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the whole game with PM < ℓM and Pm < ℓm is Pareto dominated by the
equilibrium with (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm) for the experts. There are also other equilibria that
involve price lists (PM , Pm) /∈ [max{θc, Pm + c,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
γ(1−β)+β
}, ℓM ] × [0, ℓm]. For example,
suppose (PM , Pm) ∈ [max{Pm + c,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
γ(1−β)+β
}, θc) × [0, ℓm], if γ >
β(ℓM−θc)
(θc−ℓm)(1−β)
, the
following strategies form an equilibrium of the recommendation subgame:
φH = 1, φL = 0, ρH = 0, ρL =
β(ℓM − PM)
γ(1− β)(PM − ℓm)
, λ =
Pm
PM − c
. (8)
See Lemma 9 in the appendix for the proof. These strategies can be supported as an equi-
librium of the whole game by appropriate consumer beliefs. But the experts’ payoffs from
these equilibria are again dominated by those in the equilibrium outcome in Proposition
2.
Similar to Proposition 1, no cheating on the side of the experts does not mean that
the market outcome is efficient. In the equilibrium outcome characterized in Proposition
2, both types of experts make honest recommendations in both states. Nevertheless, The
consumer disciplines the expert by declining a recommendation of major treatment with
strictly positive probability. This leads to market inefficiency. This stands in contrast to the
result that verifiability and liability resolve the market inefficiency problem if the experts’
costs are public information(see, for example, Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)). In our
setting, private information about treatment costs makes it impossible for full efficiency to
be restored through liability and verifiability.
Note that in the equilibrium outcome in Proposition 2, a minor problem is always
repaired. If k =M , the problem is either repaired at an expected cost of γc+(1−γ)θc which
occurs with probability λ = ℓm
ℓM−c
, or remains unrepaired which occurs with probability
1− λ, and in the latter case no treatment cost occurs but the consumer suffers a loss ℓM .
We summarize the social welfare level achieved in Proposition 2 in the next corollary.
Corollary 2. If γ > β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
, the social welfare level under the institution of liability
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and verifiability is given by
WLV = −β
ℓm
ℓM − c
(γc+ (1− γ)θc)− β
ℓM − c− ℓm
ℓM − c
ℓM := ∆1. (9)
We now turn to the case that the expert has a low probability to be of the cost efficient
type. The next proposition summarizes the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 3 (Overtreating outcome). Suppose γ ≤ β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
. In the experts’ Pareto
dominating equilibrium outcome, both types of experts post the same price list (PM , Pm) =
(ℓm + θc, ℓm). Given this price list, a low-cost type expert always overtreats (ρ
L = 1). A
high-cost type expert partially overtreats ( ρH = β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−γ)(1−β)θc
− γ
1−γ
∈ [0, 1)). The consumer
accepts a recommendation of major treatment with probability one (λ = 1). The experts’
expected payoffs are ΠL = ℓm + (θ − 1)c and ΠH = ℓm.
The proof of Proposition 3 shows that in the recommendation subgame following a pool-
ing price list (PM , Pm) with (PM , Pm) ∈ [Pm+θc,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
β+γ(1−β)
]× [0,min{ℓm,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
β+γ(1−β)
−
θc}], the following strategies form an equilibrium of the subgame
φH = φL = 0, ρL = 1, ρH =
β(ℓM − PM)
(1− γ)(1− β)(PM − ℓm)
−
γ
1− γ
, λ =
Pm
PM − θc
. (10)
See Lemma 10 in the appendix for the proof. The expected payoffs of the experts are
ΠL = Pm(1+
(θ−1)c
PM−θc
) and ΠH = Pm. In these subgames a low-cost expert always overtreats
and a high-cost expert partially overtreats. Because both ΠL and ΠH increases in Pm
and ΠL decreases in PM , setting (PM , Pm) = (ℓm + θc, ℓm) is the Pareto dominating
outcome for the two types of experts in the given price range. Again, there are pos-
sibly other perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria with (PM , Pm) /∈ [Pm + θc,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
β+γ(1−β)
] ×
[0,min{ℓm,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
β+γ(1−β)
− θc}]. The experts’ payoffs from those equilibria are also Pareto
dominated by the one in Proposition 3 for the given set of γ.
In the equilibrium outcome in Proposition 3, both types of experts cheat in the form
of overtreating but the price for major treatment is low relative to those in Proposition
2, the consumer always accepts a recommendation of major treatment. The inefficiency
now comes from the unnecessary treatment cost in repairing a minor problem, not from
unrepaired major problems as in Proposition 2.
In the equilibrium outcome in Proposition 3, a major problem is always repaired at an
expected cost of γc + (1 − γ)θc, while a minor problem is always repaired at an expected
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cost of γc + (1 − γ)ρHθc, with ρH = β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−γ)(1−β)θc
− γ
1−γ
. The social welfare level achieved
in Proposition 3 is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. If γ ≤ β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
, the social welfare level achieved under the institution of
liability and verifiability is given by
WLV = −β (γc+ (1− γ)θc)− (1− β)
(
γc+ (1− γ)ρHθc
)
(11)
= −β(ℓM − ℓm) + γ(θ − 1)c := ∆2.
Finally, we consider the case with intermediate γ in the next proposition. For a subset
of the parameter range, different types of experts prefer different equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 4 (Multiple equilibrium outcomes). Suppose β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
< γ ≤ β(ℓM−θc)
(1−β)(θc−ℓm)
.
If ℓm > (θ − 1)c, there exists unique γˆ1 < γˆ2 with γˆ1, γˆ2 ∈ (
β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
, β(ℓM−θc)
(1−β)(θc−ℓm)
]
such that
1. if γ ≤ γˆ1, in the experts’ Pareto dominating equilibrium outcome, both types of experts
post the same prices (PM , Pm) = (δ, δ − θc) in which δ :=
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
β+γ(1−β)
. A low-cost
type expert always overtreats (ρL = 1). A high-cost type expert behaves honestly (
ρH = 0). The consumer accepts a recommendation of major treatment with probability
one (λ = 1). The experts’ expected payoffs are ΠL = δ−c and ΠH = δ−θc. (Low-cost
type overtreating outcome.)
2. if γ ≥ γˆ2, in the experts’ Pareto dominating equilibrium outcome, both types of experts
post the price list (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm). Given this price list, both types of experts
behave honestly (that is, φt = 0, ρt = 0). A recommendation of major treatment is
rejected by a consumer with positive probability (λ = ℓm
ℓM−c
). The experts’ expected
payoffs are ΠL = ℓm and Π
H = ℓm(1−
β(θ−1)c
ℓM−c
). (No-cheating outcome.)
3. if γˆ1 < γ < γˆ2, a low-cost expert prefers the low-cost expert overtreating outcome
in [1] with price list (PM , Pm) = (δ, δ − θc) while a high-cost expert prefers the no-
cheating outcome in [2] with price list (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm). Either the outcome in
[1] or the outcome in [2] may emerge as an equilibrium outcome of the whole game.
If ℓm ≤ (θ − 1)c, there exists a unique γˆ1 ∈ (
β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
, β(ℓM−θc)
(1−β)(θc−ℓm)
] such that if γ ≤
γˆ1, the Pareto-dominating outcome is the low-cost type overtreating outcome; if γ > γˆ1,
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either the low-cost type overtreating outcome or the no-cheating outcome may emerge as
an equilibrium in the whole game.
Note that in the low-cost type overtreating outcome in Proposition 4, a minor problem
is repaired at an expected cost of γc, and a major problem is repaired at an expected
cost of γc + (1 − γ)θc. The social welfare level achieved this equilibrium outcome is
−(1−β)γc−β(γc+(1−γ)θc) = −γc−(1−γ)βθc. The no-cheating outcome of Proposition
4 is the same as that in Proposition 2, thus the social welfare achieved is the same as that
in Corollary 2.
Corollary 4. Suppose β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
< γ ≤ β(ℓM−θc)
(1−β)(θc−ℓm)
. The social welfare level achieved
under the institution of liability and verifiability is given by
WLV =


−γc− (1− γ)βθc := ∆3 if
β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
< γ ≤ γˆ1,
∆1 if γˆ2 ≤ γ ≤
β(ℓM−θc)
(1−β)(θc−ℓm)
,
∆1 or ∆3 if γˆ1 < γ < γˆ2
(12)
for ℓm > (θ − 1)c. The social welfare is given by
WLV =


∆3 if
β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
< γ ≤ γˆ1,
∆1 or ∆3 if γˆ1 < γ ≤
β(ℓM−θc)
(1−β)(θc−ℓm)
(13)
for ℓm ≤ (θ − 1)c.
Summarizing the results in Proposition 2 to 4, we see that there are two critical values
of parameter γ, the prior probability of an expert being a low-cost type, that are important
for the equilibrium outcomes. One critical value, denoted as γˆ3, is such that γˆ3 = γˆ2 if
ℓm > (θ − 1)c and γˆ3 =
β(ℓM−θc)
(1−β)(θc−ℓm)
if ℓm ≤ (θ − 1)c. When γ is relatively large, that is,
γ ≥ γˆ3, the experts’ Pareto dominating equilibrium is the no-cheating outcome, and there
the social inefficiency comes from the consumer’s rejection of a recommendation of major
treatment. The other critical value is γˆ1 as defined in Proposition 4. When γ is relatively
small, that is γ ≤ γˆ1, the Pareto dominating equilibrium is a cheating one: a low-cost
type always cheats but a high-cost type either cheats partially or does not cheat. Cheating
occurs through overtreatment, therefore, the cost of social inefficiency is the treatment cost
from repairing a minor problem through major treatment.
For a given price list, a high-cost expert benefits less from overtreatment than a low-cost
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expert because the incurred treatment cost is higher. As a result, in the cheating equilibria
in Proposition 3 and 4, a high-cost type cheats with a lower probability than a low-cost
expert.
Because a low-cost expert has a larger incentive to overtreat, when an expert is more
likely to be a low-cost type (large γ), the consumer’s best reaction is to discipline the
experts by rejecting a major treatment with a positive probability. If an expert is more
likely to be the high-cost type (a small γ), the incentive for overtreatment is relatively
small, this paired with a relatively low price for major treatment leads to the outcome that
a consumer always accepts a major treatment because the loss from being overtreated is
relatively low in comparison to the benefit from getting her problem repaired.
5 The Role of Verifiability
It is not obvious whether imposing the assumption of verifiability on top of liability im-
proves social welfare. Under the assumption L, the expert has no incentive to overtreat
the consumer because overtreating is always dominated by overcharging for the expert—
overtreating incurs the treatment cost while overcharging brings the same price without
incurring the treatment cost. Cheating in the form of mischarging does not harm so-
cial welfare directly because it is a monetary transfer between the expert and the con-
sumer. Nevertheless, it affects social welfare indirectly through the strategic behavior of
the consumer—the consumer disciplines the experts by declining an offer at high price with
positive probability. Thus, under L, social inefficiency comes from unrepaired consumer
problem.
If verifiability is added on top of liability, mischarging is ruled out, and the expert can
only cheat by overtreatment. The consumer may either discipline the experts by declining
a major treatment, which leaves a problem unresolved with positive probability, or the
experts may overtreat in case of a minor problem. Thus, under LV, social inefficiency
comes either from unrepaired consumer problem, or from wasteful overtreatment cost.
Comparing the social welfare achieved under the two institutions we arrive at the fol-
lowing results.
Proposition 5. Imposing verifiability on top of liability improves social welfare. The
benefit of verifiability weakly increases with γ if the equilibrium outcome under LV is the
no-cheating outcome in Proposition 2 and 4 or the overtreating outcome in proposition
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3. How the benefit of verifiability changes with γ is indeterminate when the equilibrium
outcome is the low-cost type overtreating outcome in Proposition 4.
When γ ≥ γˆ3, the Pareto dominating equilibrium under LV is the no-cheating outcome.
There the experts do not cheat but the consumer disciplines the expert by rejecting a
recommendation of major treatment with positive probability. Under L, a major problem
is repaired with probability ℓm
ℓM
. Under LV, a major problem is repaired with probability
ℓm
ℓM−c
which is larger than ℓm
ℓM
. The main social benefit from adding verifiability comes from
the increase in the probability that the consumer’s major problem is repaired.
When γ ≤ β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
, the Pareto dominating equilibrium under LV is the cheating
outcome in Proposition 3. There, a recommendation is always accepted, and the consumer’s
problem is always repaired. Since a low-cost expert always overtreats and a high-cost expert
partially overtreats, the main social inefficiency comes from the unnecessary treatment cost
to repair a minor problem. Our comparison shows that this social loss is smaller than the
social loss from unrepaired consumer problem under L.
When β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
< γ < γˆ3, the low-cost type overtreating outcome in Proposition
4 is either the Pareto dominating equilibrium for both types of experts or is preferred
by one type of experts over other equilibrium outcomes. There, similar to the case in
γ ≤ β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
, a recommendation is always accepted, thus the consumer’s problem is
always repaired. In this equilibrium, only a low-cost expert overtreats, therefore the social
welfare must exceed that in the case with γ ≤ β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
. Hence, the social welfare level
must also be higher than that under the institution of liability.
How the benefits of verifiability vary with parameter γ depends on the type of equi-
librium outcome that prevails. Under institution L, increasing γ does not change the
probability that a consumer’s major problem is repaired ( ℓm
ℓM
), but it increases social wel-
fare WL through reducing the expected cost of repairing a major problem. Under LV,
in the no-cheating outcome, the benefit from reduced expected cost of repairing a major
problem is amplified because a recommendation of major treatment is accepted with a
higher probability, thus increasing γ increases the benefits of verifiability.
In the overtreating outcome in Proposition 3, a larger γ reduces the expected cost of
repairing a major problem, and the overtreatment cost when k = m. These two effects
together makes a larger γ more socially appealing under LV.
In the low-cost type overtreating outcome, only a low-cost expert overtreats. When γ
increases, the effect on the reduction of overtreatment cost is weaker than in the case with
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γ ≤ β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
. As a result, how the incremental benefit of adding verifiability changes
with γ becomes ambiguous.
6 Discussions
In this section we discuss the effect of relaxing assumption (2). Suppose c ≤ ℓ¯ < θc < ℓM
instead of assumption (2). Given this parameter set, the equilibrium we identified in
Proposition 1 and Propositions 2 to 4 in which the two types of experts post the same
price list are still equilibria under L and LV respectively.
Furthermore, if γ is neither too large nor too small, there exists a uniform price equi-
librium in which the two types of experts post the same single price p¯ under the two
institutions. When a single price is posted for both types of treatment, the expert’s strat-
egy is either to recommend repairing the consumer’s problem at price p¯, or declining to
treat the consumer. Therefore there is no difference whether verifiability is in place or
not. Again we focus on the equilibrium outcome that is Pareto dominating for the experts
within the class of uniform price equilibrium.
Proposition 6 (Uniform-price Equilibrium). Suppose c ≤ ℓ¯ < θc < ℓM . Under both insti-
tutions, L and LV, if γ ∈ ( (1−β)(c−ℓm)
β(ℓM−c)
, (1−β)(θc−ℓm)
β(ℓM−θc)
], there exists a uniform-price equilibrium
in which both types of experts post a single price p¯ = γβℓM+(1−β)ℓm
γβ+1−β
, a low-cost expert offers
to repair the consumer’s problem in both states at price p¯, a high-cost expert offers to repair
the consumer’s problem at price p¯ if k = m and declines to treat a consumer if k = M .
The consumer accepts the expert’s recommendation with probability one.
In the equilibrium in Proposition 6, the existence of the low-cost expert creates an
incentive for the high-cost expert to cream skim the consumer with a minor problem
and dump the consumer with a major problem. Under the uniform price equilibrium,
the equilibrium outcome is the same under L and LV, therefore it does not change our
comparison of social welfare in Section 5.
7 Conclusion
We study a credence goods market in which the expert holds private information about his
treatment cost besides knowing more about the nature of the consumer’s problem than the
consumer. We analyze the market equilibria under the assumption of i) liability; ii) liability
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and verifiability. Under liability, cheating may occur in the form of overcharging, a pure
monetary transfer between the consumer and the expert; under liability and verifiability,
cheating may occur in the form of overtreatment, which involves wasteful treatment cost in
repairing a minor problem. We show that neither institutions implement socially efficiently
outcome. Adding verifiability improves social welfare because it increases the probability
that a major problem is repaired and the associated overtreatment cost is dominated by
the gain from more problems being repaired.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof proceeds as follows: 1) In Lemma 1 to 3, we characterize the equilibria of a
recommendation subgame following an exogenous pooling price (PM , Pm) in which the two
types of experts have posted the same price list. 2) In Lemma 4, we show the experts’
payoffs in Lemma 3 Pareto dominate the others. 3) In Lemma 5, we show that pooling
price (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm) is supported as an equilibrium of the whole game. 4) In Lemma
6, we show that there exists no other equilibrium with separating prices or uniform single
price.
Lemma 1. Suppose both types of experts have posted the price list (PM , Pm) with (PM , Pm) ∈
[0, ℓm] × [0, ℓm]. The recommendation subgame has an equilibrium in which both types of
experts adopt the following strategies
φH = φL = 1, ρH = ρL = 1, λ = 1. (14)
In this equilibrium, the expert’s payoff is
ΠL = ΠH = (1− β)PM . (15)
Proof. Suppose the prices indeed satisfy (PM , Pm) ∈ [0, ℓm]× [0, ℓm]. Given the strategies
of the expert, if the expert offers to repair her problem at PM , the consumer believes
that she has a minor problem. Since PM ≤ ℓm, the consumer accepts the offer. Since
PM ≤ ℓm < c < θc, both types of experts rejects to treat the consumer if k = M . The
profits of the expert follow directly from the given strategies of the players.
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Lemma 2. Suppose both types of experts have posted a price list (PM , Pm) with (PM , Pm) ∈
[c, θc)× [0, ℓm]. The recommendation subgame has an equilibrium in which
φL = 0, φH = 1, ρL = ρH =
γβ(ℓM − PM)
(1− β)(PM − ℓm)
, λ =
Pm
PM
. (16)
The expected payoffs of the experts are respectively
ΠH = (1− β)Pm, Π
L = β(PM − c)
Pm
PM
+ (1− β)Pm. (17)
Proof. Suppose the posted prices indeed satisfy (PM , Pm) ∈ [c, θc) × [0, ℓm]. If k = M , a
low-cost expert is willing to repair the problem at PM while a high-cost expert rejects to
treat the consumer. If k = m, given the strategy of the consumer, offering PM brings a
payoff λPM = Pm to both types of experts, thus any ρ
t ∈ [0, 1] is optimal for either type of
the expert. Given the expert’s strategy, on receiving an offer at PM , the consumer believes
her problem is major with probability βγ
βγ+(1−β)(γρH+(1−γ)ρL)
. Thus, rejecting such an offer
brings her a payoff
uR =−
(
(1− β)(γρH + (1− γ)ρL)
βγ + (1− β)(γρH + (1− γ)ρL)
ℓm +
βγ
βγ + (1− β)(γρH + (1− γ)ρL)
ℓM
)
=− PM
which is the same as her payoff from accepting an offer at PM and having her problem
repaired. Thus, any λ ∈ [0, 1] is optimal for the consumer. The expected payoffs of the
experts in the equilibrium follow from the given strategies.
Lemma 3. Suppose both types have posted a price list (PM , Pm) ∈ [θc, ℓM ] × [0, ℓm]. The
recommendation subgame has an equilibrium in which both types of experts use the following
strategies
φH = φL = 0, ρH = ρL =
β(ℓM − PM)
(1− β)(PM − ℓm)
, λ =
Pm
PM
. (18)
The experts’ expected profits are respectively
ΠH = β(PM − θc)
Pm
PM
+ (1− β)Pm, Π
L = β(PM − c)
Pm
PM
+ (1− β)Pm. (19)
Proof. Suppose the experts have indeed posted the same price list (PM , Pm) ∈ [θc, ℓM ] ×
[0, ℓm]. Since PM ≥ θc, both types of experts offer to repair the problem at PM if k = M . If
k = m, given the consumer’s strategy, proposing PM brings a payoff of λPM =
Pm
PM
Pm = Pm
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for both types of experts. Thus, any ρt ∈ [0, 1] is optimal for the expert.
Given the expert’s strategy, on receiving an offer PM , the consumer believes that her
problem is major with probability β
β+(1−β)(γρL+(1−γ)ρH )
, thus rejecting the offer brings her
an expected payoff
uR = −
(
(1− β)(γρL + (1− γ)ρH)
β + (1− β)(γρL + (1− γ)ρH)
ℓm +
β
β + (1− β)(γρL + (1− γ)ρH)
ℓM
)
= −PM (20)
which is the same as her payoff from accepting the offer at price PM and getting her
problem resolved. Thus, any λ ∈ [0, 1] is optimal for the consumer. Therefore, the proposed
strategies are indeed mutually best responses. The expected payoffs of the experts follow
from the strategies.
Lemma 4. The experts’ payoffs are weakly higher if the pooling price list satisfies (PM , Pm) ∈
[θc, ℓM ]×[0, ℓm] than if it satisfies (PM , Pm) ∈ [0, ℓm]×[0, ℓm] or (PM , Pm) ∈ [c, θc)×[0, ℓm].
Proof. With the subgame equilibrium outcome in Lemma 1, the experts’ payoffs are max-
imized at (1− β)ℓm by setting PM = ℓm.
With the subgame equilibrium outcome in Lemma 2, the expected profits of both types
of experts increase in Pm, and the low-cost type expert’s payoff increases in PM as well.
Therefore, the maximal profits are
ΠH = (1− β)ℓm, Π
L < ℓm(1−
β
θ
), (21)
achieved by setting Pm = ℓm and PM infinitely close to θc.
With the subgame equilibrium outcome in Lemma 3, the maximal profits are
ΠH = ℓm −
βθcℓm
ℓM
, ΠL = ℓm −
βcℓm
ℓM
, (22)
achieved by setting (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm). Comparing the maximal payoffs immediately
leads to our claim.
Lemma 5. Both types of experts posting a price list (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm) indeed forms a
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the whole game.
Proof. We need to show that the experts have no incentive to unilaterally deviate from the
price list (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm) at the price setting stage. There are two ways of possible
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unilateral deviations: i) a single price P ′; ii) a price list (P ′M , P
′
m) 6= (ℓM , ℓm). Consider a
deviation to a single price P ′. We construct the off-equilibrium path belief as follows: the
consumer believes the deviating expert is a high-cost type, if P ′ ≤ θc her problem is minor
and if P ′ > θc her problem is major with probability β. Given her beliefs, the consumer’s
optimal strategy following a price P ′ is to accept an offer if P ′ ≤ ℓm and decline if P
′ > ℓm
because ℓ¯ < c < θc and no expert offers to repair a major problem at price ℓ¯. Given the
consumer’s strategy, the expert’s deviation profit is bounded from above by (1 − β)ℓm,
which is lower than the expert’s expected profit from proposing (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm). A
similar argument shows that unilateral deviation to (P ′M , P
′
m) is not profitable either.
Lemma 6. There exists no uniform price equilibrium in which the two types of experts post
the same single price or separating equilibrium in which the two types post different prices.
Proof. Suppose there is indeed a uniform price equilibrium with a single price P , due to
the assumption ℓ¯ < c, there is no equilibrium in which the experts are willing to repair
both types of problems at a single price. In a uniform price equilibrium, if both types
rejects to treat the consumer if k = M , the maximal profits for both types of experts are
(1 − β)ℓm, which is obviously dominated, as shown in Lemma 4. Thus, the equilibrium
strategy profile in a uniform price equilibrium must involve
φH = 1, φL = 0, ρL = ρH = 1, λ = 1. (23)
That is, a high-cost expert rejects to repair a major problem. A low-cost expert always
offers to repair the consumer’s problem at price P and a high-cost expert offers to repair
the consumer’s problem at price P if k = m. Given these strategies, if a consumer rejects
an offer at price P , her expected payoff is
uR = −
βγ
βγ + (1− β)
ℓM −
1− β
βγ + (1− β)
ℓm. (24)
The consumer only accepts the offer with positive probability if
P ≤
βγ
βγ + (1− β)
ℓM +
1− β
βγ + (1− β)
ℓm.
Note that
βγ
βγ + (1− β)
ℓM +
1− β
βγ + (1− β)
ℓm ≤ ℓ¯ < c, (25)
a low-cost expert is not willing to repair a major problem at P . Thus there exists no
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feasible price such that the strategies in (23) form an equilibrium.
Two types of separating equilibria candidates are to be considered. i) The two types of
experts post different price list (PHM , P
H
m ) and (P
L
M , P
L
m) which perfectly reveals the type of
the expert. The consumers accepts an offer at P tM with probability λ
t = P
t
m
P t
M
. Note that the
payoffs of the experts are Πt = P tm. To prevent imitation, it is necessary that P
H
m = P
L
m.
Therefore, PHM 6= P
L
M in a separating equilibrium. Suppose P
H
M > P
L
M . Then, for a low-cost
expert, posting (PLM , P
L
m) brings a payoff equal to P
L
m. Posting (P
H
M , P
H
m ) instead brings a
payoff
β(PHM − c)
PHm
PHM
+ (1− β)PHm > P
L
m (26)
using PHm = P
L
m. Thus, there exists no separating equilibrium with P
H
M > P
L
M . The same
is true if PHM < P
L
M .
ii) One type posts a single price and the other type posts a price list. Suppose a low-cost
expert posts a single price P¯ and a high-cost expert posts a price list (PHM , P
H
m ). For the
consumer to accept P¯ , P¯ ≤ ℓ¯ has to hold. By our assumption, ℓ¯ < c, thus a low-cost expert
is not willing to repair the consumer’s problem at a price P¯ that is always acceptable to
the consumer. The same logic applies if a high-cost expert posts a single price.
Proof of Propositions 2 to 4
To prepare for the proofs of Propositions 2 to 4, we characterize the equilibria of the
subgame following an exogenous pooling price list (PM , Pm) in Lemma 7 to 10.
Lemma 7 (Low-cost expert partially overtreats, high-cost expert behaves honestly). Sup-
pose the two types of experts have posted the same price list (PM , Pm) such that (PM , Pm) ∈
[max{θc, Pm + c,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
γ(1−β)+β
}, ℓM ]× [0, ℓm]. The following strategies form an equilibrium
of the recommendation subgame:
φH = φL = 0, ρH = 0, ρL =
β(ℓM − PM)
γ(1− β)(PM − ℓm)
, λ =
Pm
PM − c
, (27)
in which a high-cost expert treats the consumer honestly and a low-cost type expert partially
overtreats. The experts’ expected payoffs are respectively
ΠH = β(PM − θc)
Pm
PM − c
+ (1− β)Pm, Π
L = Pm. (28)
Proof. Suppose the experts have indeed posted the same price list that satisfies (PM , Pm) ∈
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[max{θc, Pm + c,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
γ(1−β)+β
}, ℓM ] × [0, ℓm]. Since PM ≥ θc, both types of experts are
willing to repair a major problem. PM ≥ Pm+c ensures λ ≤ 1. PM ≥
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
γ(1−β)+β
ensures
ρL ≤ 1.
Given k = m, a high-cost expert receives Pm by recommending T = m and receives
λ(PM −θc) by recommending T =M and being rejected with probability 1−λ. Given the
consumer’s strategy, Pm >
Pm
PM−c
(PM − θc) because θ > 1, and thus ρ
H = 0 is the high-cost
expert’s optimal choice.
Given k = m, a low-cost expert receives Pm by recommending T = m and receives
λ(PM − c) by recommending T =M and being declined with probability 1− λ. Given the
consumer’s strategy, the two payoffs are the same and thus any ρL ∈ [0, 1] is optimal for
the low-cost type expert.
Given the strategies of the expert, a consumer accepting T = M treatment receives
utility uA = −PM and by declining the major treatment she expects a loss
uR = −
(
(1− β)γρL
β + (1− β)γρL
ℓm +
β
β + (1− β)γρL
ℓM
)
= −PM = u
A. (29)
Therefore, any λ ∈ [0, 1] is an optimal strategy for the consumer. Thus, given a price
list satisfying PM ∈ [max{θc, Pm + c,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
γ(1−β)+β
}, ℓM ] and Pm ≤ ℓm, the strategies of
the expert and the consumer in (27) are mutually best responses. The experts’ expected
payoffs follow from the given strategies.
Lemma 8 (Efficient Outcome). Suppose ℓm ≥ (θ− 1)c. Suppose both types of experts have
posted the same price list with (PM , Pm) with (PM , Pm) ∈ [θc, Pm + c]× [(θ− 1)c, ℓm]. The
following strategies form an equilibrium of the recommendation subgame:
φH = φL = 0, ρL = ρH = 0, λ = 1. (30)
Both types of experts treat the consumer honestly. The ex ante expected payoffs of the
experts are respectively
ΠH = β(PM − θc) + (1− β)Pm, Π
L = β(PM − c) + (1− β)Pm (31)
Proof. Since the prices satisfy θc ≤ PM ≤ Pm+ c and Pm ≥ (θ−1)c, both types of experts
are willing to treat a major problem.
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Given the strategy of the consumer, if k = m, for a high-cost expert, recommending
a major treatment brings a payoff PM − θc and recommending a minor treatment brings
a payoff Pm. Note that PM − θc < PM − c. Since PM ≤ Pm + c, PM − θc < Pm, and a
high-cost expert will recommend T = m truthfully, that is, ρH = 0.
For a low-cost expert, if k = m, recommending a major treatment brings a payoff
PM − c while recommending a minor treatment brings a payoff Pm. Because PM − c ≤ Pm,
a low-cost expert has no incentive to overtreat the consumer, that is, ρL = 0.
Given the strategies of the experts, if the consumer accepts a recommendation of major
treatment, her payoff is −PM , and rejecting the recommendation brings a payoff −ℓM .
Because PM ≤ Pm + c ≤ ℓm + c ≤ ℓM , accepting the recommendation is an optimal choice
for the consumer. The expected payoffs of the experts follow from the strategies.
Lemma 9 (High-cost expert dumps and low-cost type overtreats). Suppose both types
of experts have posted the same price list (PM , Pm) such that (PM , Pm) ∈ [max{Pm +
c, βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
γ(1−β)+β
}, θc)× [0, ℓm]. If γ >
β(ℓM−θc)
(θc−ℓm)(1−β)
, the following strategies form an equilib-
rium of the recommendation subgame:
φH = 1, φL = 0, ρH = 0, ρL =
β(ℓM − PM)
γ(1− β)(PM − ℓm)
, λ =
Pm
PM − c
. (32)
A high-cost expert rejects to treat a major problem and a low-cost expert partially overtreats.
The expected payoffs of the experts are
ΠH = (1− β)Pm, Π
L = Pm. (33)
Proof. Given max{Pm+ c,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
γ(1−β)+β
} ≤ PM < θc, a high-cost expert rejects to repair a
major problem because PM − θc < 0 and a low-cost expert is willing to to repair a major
problem because PM ≥ Pm + c > c. PM ≥
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
γ(1−β)+β
ensures ρL ≤ 1. The condition
γ > β(ℓM−θc)
(θc−ℓm)(1−β)
ensures that βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
γ(1−β)+β
< θc so that a feasible PM indeed exists.
If k = m, a high-cost expert obviously has no incentive to overtreat because PM < θc.
For a low-cost expert, overtreating brings a payoff λ(PM − c) = Pm, which is the same as
his payoff from honest recommendation. Therefore, any ρL ∈ [0, 1] is a best response for a
low-cost expert.
For the consumer, accepting a recommendation of major treatment brings a payoff of
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−PM , and rejecting such a recommendation brings a payoff
uR = −
(
(1− β)γρL
β + (1− β)γρL
ℓm +
β
β + (1− β)γρL
ℓM
)
= −PM . (34)
Since the payoffs from rejecting and accepting a major treatment is the same, any λ ∈
[0, 1] is a best response for the consumer. The payoffs of the experts follow from the
strategies.
Lemma 10 (Low-cost type fully overtreats and high-cost type partially overtreats). Suppose
both types of experts have posted the same price with (PM , Pm) ∈ [Pm + θc,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
β+γ(1−β)
]×
[0,min{ℓm,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
β+γ(1−β)
− θc}]. If γ ≤ β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
∈ [0, 1], the following strategies form an
equilibrium of the recommendation subgame:
φH = φL = 0, ρL = 1, ρH =
β(ℓM − PM)
(1− γ)(1− β)(PM − ℓm)
−
γ
1− γ
, λ =
Pm
PM − θc
. (35)
The expected payoffs of the experts are ΠL = Pm(1 +
(θ−1)c
PM−θc
) and ΠH = Pm.
Proof. Suppose the prices indeed satisfy Pm ≤ min{ℓm,
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
β+γ(1−β)
− θc}, and Pm+ θc ≤
PM ≤
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
β+γ(1−β)
. Note that γ ≤ β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
∈ [0, 1] ensures that βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
β+γ(1−β)
− θc ≥ 0
so that a feasible Pm indeed exists.
Note that both types of experts are willing to treat a major problem because PM ≥
Pm+θc ≥ θc. Given the consumer’s strategy, for a low-cost expert, if k = m, recommending
T = m brings him a payoff Pm, while recommending a major treatment brings a payoff
λ(PM − c) =
Pm
PM−θc
(PM − c) > Pm. Thus ρ
L = 1 is optimal for a low-cost expert.
For a high-cost expert, for k = m, recommending a major treatment brings a payoff
λ(PM − θc) = Pm, the same as his payoff from recommending a minor treatment. Thus,
any ρH ∈ [0, 1] is optimal.
When recommended a major treatment, the consumer updates her belief that she is
visiting either a high-cost expert who recommends M with probability β(ℓM−PM )
(1−γ)(1−β)(PM−ℓm)
−
γ
1−γ
when k = m or a low-cost expert who always recommends M for her. By accepting
a major treatment, her problem is resolved and her payoff is −PM . By rejecting a major
treatment, the consumer’s expected payoff is
uR = −
β
β + (1− β)(γ + (1− γ)ρH)
ℓM −
(1− β)(γ + (1− γ)ρH)
β + (1− β)(γ + (1− γ)ρH)
ℓm = −PM
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Thus any λ ∈ [0, 1] is optimal for the consumer. The expected payoffs of the experts follow
from the given strategies.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first show that the price list (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm) is optimal
for both types of experts. We then show that (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm) is sustained as a perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the whole game.
Note that if γ > β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
holds, the subgame equilibrium in Lemma 10 does not exist.
Thus it suffices to compare the subgame equilibria in Lemma 7 to Lemma 9 to characterize
the experts’ optimal choice of prices and the equilibrium outcome of the entire game.
In Lemma 7, ΠH and ΠL reach their maximal values
ΠH = β(ℓM − θc)
ℓm
ℓM − c
+ (1− β)ℓm = ℓm(1−
β(θ − 1)c
ℓM − c
), ΠL = ℓm (36)
with price list (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm).
In Lemma 8, the maximal values of the experts’ payoffs are
ΠH = β(PM − θc) + (1− β)Pm = β(ℓm − (θ − 1)c) + (1− β)ℓm,
ΠL = β(PM − c) + (1− β)Pm = ℓm,
achieved with price list (PM , Pm) = (ℓm + c, ℓm).
In Lemma 9, the maximal values of the experts’ payoffs are
ΠH = (1− β)ℓm, Π
L = ℓm. (37)
achieved with Pm = ℓm.
Direct comparison shows that the expected payoffs of both types of experts are the
highest in the equilibrium outcome in Lemma 7 with price list (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm).
Furthermore, as under the institution of liability, there exists no uniform price equilib-
rium in which the two types of experts post the same single price or separating equilibrium
in which the two types post different prices. By constructing the consumer’s beliefs in
the same way as in Proposition 1, we can show that the experts have no incentive to
unilaterally deviate from price list (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm) at the price setting stage.
Proof of Proposition 3. We first show that (PM , Pm) = (ℓm + θc, ℓm) is optimal choice of
prices for the experts. We then confirm this price list can be sustained as an equilibrium
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of the whole game.
If γ ≤ β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
∈ [0, 1], the subgame equilibrium in Lemma 9 does not exist while
the subgame equilibrium in Lemma 10 holds. Note that comparison of the experts’ payoffs
in Lemma 7 and 8 is the same as in Proposition 2. Thus, we need to compare the outcome
in Lemma 10 with the outcome in Proposition 2 for the optimal price choice of the experts
and the equilibria of the whole game.
Let’s first consider the outcome in Lemma 10. Since γ ≤ β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
, Pm ≤ ℓm because
ℓm ≤
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
β+γ(1−β)
− θc. Further note that both ΠL = Pm(1 +
(θ−1)c
PM−θc
) and ΠH = Pm
increase in Pm, and Π
L decreases in PM . Both types of the experts’ payoffs are maximized
by setting Pm = ℓm and PM = ℓm + θc. The experts’ maximal payoffs are given by
ΠH = ℓm, Π
L = ℓm + (θ − 1)c, (38)
both of which are higher than those from Proposition 2.
Again, as under the institution of liability, there exists no uniform price equilibrium in
which the two types of experts post the same single price or separating equilibrium in which
the two types post different prices. Finally, since the profits of both types of experts in
Proposition 3 are larger than those in Proposition 2, we can construct the consumer’s off-
equilibrium path beliefs in the same way to guarantee that the experts have no incentive
to unilaterally deviate from the price list (PM , Pm) = (ℓm + θc, ℓm) at the price setting
stage.
Proof of Proposition 4. If β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
< γ ≤ β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
, the recommendation subgame
equilibrium in Lemma 10 exists. For the optimal prices of the experts, we need to compare
the experts’ payoffs in recommendation subgames in Lemma 7, 8 and 10. The optimal prices
for the experts in Lemma 10 are Pm = δ− θc and PM = δ in which δ :=
βℓM+γ(1−β)ℓm
β+γ(1−β)
. The
maximal payoffs of the experts are
Π˜H = δ − θc, Π˜L = δ − c. (39)
The experts’ payoffs in the subgame equilibrium in Lemma 8 are always weakly dominated
by those in Lemma 7 due to our assumption ℓM > ℓm + θc. The experts’ expected payoffs
in Lemma 7 are
ΠH = ℓm(1−
β(θ − 1)c
ℓM − c
), ΠL = ℓm. (40)
Therefore, which equilibrium is Pareto dominating for the experts depend on the compar-
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ison of Π˜t and Πt.
Define γˆ1 as the solution to
βℓM+γˆ1(1−β)ℓm
β+γˆ1(1−β)
− θc = ℓm(1−
β(θ−1)c
ℓM−c
) and γˆ2 as the solution
to βℓM+γˆ2(1−β)ℓm
β+γˆ2(1−β)
− c = ℓm. Notice that
dδ
dγ
< 0, so dΠ˜
H
dγ
< 0 and dΠ˜
L
dγ
< 0. Furthermore,
θc + ℓm(1 −
β(θ−1)c
ℓM−c
) > c + ℓm, then γˆ2 > γˆ1. Note that γˆ1 always falls in the range of
(β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
, β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
], while γˆ2 falls in the range of (
β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
, β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
) if (θ −
1)c < ℓm, and γˆ2 ≥
β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
if ℓm ≤ (θ − 1)c.
If ℓm > (θ − 1)c, there exists unique γˆ1 and γˆ2 such that
β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
< γˆ1 < γˆ2 <
β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
. Then we have
1. If γ ≤ γˆ1, then Π˜
H = δ − θc ≥ ΠH = ℓm(1 −
β(θ−1)c
ℓM−c
) and Π˜L = δ − c > ΠL = ℓm.
Both types of experts are better off in the most profitable equilibrium outcome in
Lemma 10 with price list (PM , Pm) = (δ, δ − θc) than in the equilibrium outcome in
Lemma 7.
Plugging PM = δ and Pm = δ − θc into (35) gives ρ
H = 0. Thus, in this Pareto
dominating equilibrium, a low-cost expert cheats but a high-cost expert behaves
truthfully. We refer to this case as the “low-cost type overtreating outcome”.
2. If γ ≥ γˆ2, then Π˜
H = δ − θc < ΠH = ℓm(1 −
β(θ−1)c
ℓM−c
) and Π˜L = δ − c ≤ ΠL = ℓm.
Both types of experts prefer the most profitable equilibrium outcome in Lemma 7
with price list (PM , Pm) = (ℓM , ℓm) over the equilibrium outcome in Lemma 10. This
is the same “no-cheating outcome” as in Proposition 2.
3. If γˆ1 < γ < γˆ2, then Π˜
H = δ−θc < Π˜H = ℓm(1−
β(θ−1)c
ℓM−c
) and Π˜L = δ− c > ΠL = ℓm.
No Pareto-dominating equilibrium exists. Either the most profitable outcome in
Lemma 7 or 10 may emerge as an equilibrium in the whole game.
If ℓm ≥ (θ− 1)c, there exists a unique γˆ1 such that
β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
< γˆ1 <
β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
, but
γˆ2 ≥
β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
. As a result, if γ ≤ γˆ1, the Pareto dominating equilibrium is the low-cost
type overtreating outcome. If γ > γˆ1, the two types of experts prefer different equilibrium
outcome. Either the low-cost type overtreating outcome or the no-cheating outcome may
emerge in the whole game.
To make the proof complete, we can construct the off-equilibrium path belief of the
consumers in the same way as that in Proposition 2 to guarantee that the experts have no
incentive to unilaterally deviate from the optimal price list stated in the proposition at the
price setting stage.
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Proof of Proposition 5. If γ > β(ℓM−cθ)
(1−β)(cθ−ℓm)
, comparing the social welfare level in Corollary
2 and in Corollary 1 gives
∆W = ∆1 −WL
= −β
ℓm
ℓM − c
(γc + (1− γ)θc)− β
ℓM − c− ℓm
ℓM − c
ℓM −
(
−β(ℓM − ℓm)− β
ℓm
ℓM
(γc+ (1− γ)θc)
)
=
βℓmc
(ℓM − c)ℓM
(ℓM − (γc+ (1− γ)θc)) > 0 (41)
in which the inequality obtains because ℓM > γc + (1− γ)θc.
If γ ≤ β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
, comparing the social welfare level in Corollary 3 and 1 gives
∆W = ∆2 −WL
= −β(ℓM − ℓm) + γ(θ − 1)c−
(
−β(ℓM − ℓm)− β
ℓm
ℓM
(γc+ (1− γ)θc)
)
(42)
= γ(θ − 1)c+ β
ℓm
ℓM
(γc+ (1− γ)θc) > 0 (43)
If β(ℓM−ℓm−θc)
(1−β)θc
< γ ≤ β(ℓM−θc)
(1−β)(θc−ℓm)
, the social welfare level is either ∆1 or ∆3 (see Corollary
4). We have already shown that ∆1 is larger than WL. Further note that the equilibrium
outcome that delivers social welfare level ∆3 is such that only a low-cost expert overtreats,
thus ∆3 > ∆2 must hold. Therefore, ∆3 > WL.
In summary, the social welfare achieved in the equilibrium outcomes under LV is always
higher than that under only liability. Therefore, adding verifiability improves social welfare.
Next we show how ∆W varies with γ. Notice that the social welfare level under LV is
either ∆1, ∆2 or ∆3. If ∆W = ∆1 −WL, we have
∂∆W
∂γ
=
βℓmc
(ℓM − c)ℓM
(θ − 1)c > 0. (44)
If ∆W = ∆2 −WL, we have
∂∆W
∂γ
= (1− β
ℓm
ℓM
)(θ − 1)c > 0. (45)
If ∆W = ∆3 −WL, we have
∂∆W
∂γ
= β(1−
ℓm
ℓM
)θc− (1− β
ℓm
ℓM
)c, (46)
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the sign of which is indeterminate. This is the case in the low-cost type overtreating
outcome in Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose γ ≤ ( (1−β)(c−ℓm)
β(ℓM−c)
, (1−β)(θc−ℓm)
β(ℓM−θc)
] hold.
1. Given the expert’s strategies, the consumer’s strategy is optimal. If the expert offers
to repair the problem at price p¯, the consumer believes that her problem is major
with probability γβ
γβ+1−β
and minor with probability 1−β
γβ+1−β
. Thus, the consumer’s
expected utility from rejecting the offer is
uR =
γβ
γβ + 1− β
ℓM +
1− β
γβ + 1− β
ℓm (47)
which equals p¯, the price she pays for accepting the offer and getting her problem
resolved. Thus, the consumer accepts a repair offer at price p¯ with probability 1.
2. We characterize the consumer’s equilibrium strategy in the recommendation subgame
following a single price p′ 6= p¯. The off-equilibrium path belief is such that a price
deviation at the first stage is made by a high-cost type, and if p′ < θc, her problem
is minor and if p′ ≥ θc her problem is major with probability β. Given her belief,
the consumer only accepts a repair offer at price p′ ≤ ℓm. Accepting a repair offer
at price p′ ∈ (ℓm, θc) will result in a loss ℓm − p
′. Accepting a repair offer at price
p′ ∈ [θc, ℓM ] results in a loss p
′ − ℓ¯ because ℓ¯ < θc by assumption.
We now characterize the consumer’s equilibrium strategy in the recommendation sub-
game following a price list (Pm, PM), with Pm < PM . The consumer’s off-equilibrium
path belief is constructed similarly as before. She believes that the price deviation is
made by a high-cost expert. At the recommendation stage, the expert either recom-
mends to repair the consumer’s problem at price p˜ ∈ {Pm, PM} or declines to treat
the consumer. Upon being recommended p˜, the consumer believes her problem is
minor for p˜ < θc and major with probability β for p˜ ≥ θc. For the same argument in
the last paragraph, the consumer only accepts an offer of repairing the problem at
p˜ ≤ ℓm.
3. A high-cost expert. In the recommendation subgame following p¯, a high-cost expert
will offer to repair the consumer’s problem only in state k = m because p¯ < θc. If he
deviates to a different price p′, since the consumer only accepts an offer with p′ ≤ ℓm,
the maximal profit the high-cost expert can achieve is (1− β)ℓm which is lower than
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his profit from offering p¯ and getting (1−β)p¯. The same happens if the expert offers
price list (Pm, PM) with PM > Pm.
4. A low-cost expert. Because p¯ > c, a low-cost expert receives a positive profit in both
states by offering to repair the consumer’s problem at price p¯. Following the same
argument in [3], a low-cost expert will offer the price p¯ instead of other prices.
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